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BANK CHARGE CARDS: NEW CASH
OR NEW CREDIT
Roland E. Brandel* and Carl A. Leonard**
1.

INTRODUCTION

charge cards have become a subject of interest only recently,
but that interest has been intense. They have provided the impetus for legislative inquiry and statutes at both the state and federal
levels, and hearings and regulations by such agencies as the Federal
Trade Commission and the Federal Reserve Board. Many articles
are appearing in both the mass media and professional journals, not
all of which, at the risk of significant understatement, have been
flattering to the charge card industry. Urgings to suppress the "plastic
menace" are not uncommon.
The entire concept of bank charge cards and interchange systems
is novel, imaginative, and complex. Those who innovated learned
rapidly, albeit painfully, from that best of teachers, experience. The
early experiences have induced many changes in the business practices of the bank charge card industry. Because of the explosive nature of the growth of the industry, much of the material describing
the industry and much of the legislation directed toward it has dealt
with historical problems, not with the industry's current condition.
By the time the author of an article or a legislative proposal has
accumulated the relevant facts and statistics, his data may no longer
reflect the current status of the industry.
This Article will deal with one highly controversial aspect of the
use of bank charge cards: the issue whether a consumer who purchases goods or services from a merchant and pays for them by using
a bank charge card should be able to assert against ·the bank that
issued the charge card legal defenses that he may have against the
merchant. It will also describe, as of the· present, the operations of
the bank charge card industry's highly sophisticated credit extension
and payment system. More importantly, to stave off instant obsolescence, it will describe some discernible trends that should be con-
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sidered in arriving at a proper resolution of the principal issue under
discussion, so that the resolution will serve as well the near term
future as it does the present.
The issue is ripe for resolution. Most states have not yet dealt with
the issue of the assertability of consumer defenses in the bank charge
card context, but cases raising the issue are now being litigated.
The Massachusetts legislature recently dealt with the problem/ as
did the National Consumer Act and the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, which took very different approaches to it.2 Legislation on the
issue has been introduced in Congress and in the State of New York
and is likely to be introduced in other state legislatures in the near
future. 3 The Federal Trade Commission has recently promulgated a
proposed rule on the preservation of buyer's defenses.4
It is the premise of this Article that the bank charge card systems
constitute a new, highly useful, and efficient payment and credit
mechanism; that any decision-making body that promulgates a rule
on the issue of the assertability of consumer defenses must carefully
evaluate the true functions of bank charge cards, particularly their
role as part of a sophisticated payment mechanism, and weigh the
relative interests of the consuming public, merchants, and members
of the banking industry to derive the best solution for society; that
courts are ill-equipped to perform this function; and, that, given the
national and international usage of bank charge cards, a uniform rule
is imperative. The Article will first analyze each of these premises
and then proceed to suggest a rule that seems effectively to balance
the various interests involved.
II.

.

OPERATIONAL AsPECTS OF BANK

CHARGE

CARD

SYSTEMS

It is of little use to attempt to evaluate proposed rules relating
to bank charge card systems unless one understands the processes
involved and economic realities inherent in their operation. Wonderfully consistent and persuasive arguments can be constructed by
1. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1970). Quaere whether this provision
would cover multiparty charge card systems, in which the issuer and seller are not
parties to a "prior agreement." See also note 101 infra.
2. Compare NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r §§ 2.406(1), (2)(g) (First Final Draft) [hereinafter NCA] with UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 1.301(9), 3.106(3) [hereinafter
UCCC]. See note 49 infra. The UCCC has been adopted in Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma,
Utah, and Wyoming and is being considered by the legislatures of 22 states. I CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE ,J,J 4770-71 (1971).
3. S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 169 (1971); S. 6483-A, N.Y. Legis., 1971-1972 Reg. Sess.
(April 22, 1971).
4. Proposed FTC Reg. § 433.1, 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971).
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consumer advocates on the one hand and by commercial interests
involved in bank charge card transactions on the other by simply
ignoring some important aspects of the relationships between the
many parties to a charge card transaction. What follows, then, is
an analysis of how bank charge card systems operate and some indication of predictable future modifications of those systems.
Paramount among the several parties to bank charge card transactions" is a bank (issuer) that issues charge cards to the public. The
issuer establishes an account on behalf of the person (cardholder) to
whom the card is issued, and the cardholder and issuer enter into an
agreement that governs their relationship. The cardholder agreement
establishes a line of credit under which the cardholder may incur
obligations to the issuer by a purchase of goods or services or through
a cash advance. 6 Typically, it provides two options to the cardholder:
he may either make payment in full within a specified period after
being billed, free of finance charges, or he may defer payments.7 At
the time of the transaction, the cardholder may not have decided
which option he will use; his decision may readily be deferred until
the time the initial payment is due. The cardholder must then decide
whether to use his card as a mere medium of exchange or "convenience card," or whether to assume the role of a borrower with respect to the issuer.
Merchants enter into agreements with any bank (depositary
bank), wherever located, that is a member of the interchange system
to which the issuer belongs. These agreements enable them to accept
evidences of obligations of the cardholder to the issuer (sales slips)
as payment for goods and services. Typically, the merchant agreement
will provide that the merchant must honor all charge cards issued by
a member bank of the interchange system that are properly presented
to him to pay for goods or services. The merchant must also perform
certain routine clerical acts in filling out the sales slip. He will typically then deposit the sales slip in an ordinary checking account at
5. Bank charge card transactions are referred to in this Article as multiparty:
they involve a consumer, a merchant, and, frequently, two or more banks. This
reference serves to distinguish them from seller charge card plans and tripartite
plans such as Diners Club. Although the term "tripartite" has been used in some
literature to distinguish bank charge card transactions from two-party, or seller,
charge card plans, we will not refer to bank charge card transactions as tripartite
in this Article. Such a reference would obscure an important point-that most bank
charge card transactions are multiparty-which is crucial to a proper understanding
of the relationship of the parties.
6. A cash advance involves a direct disbursement of cash to a cardholder by a bank.
7. FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, REPORT: BANK CREDIT-CARI> AND CHECK-CREDIT PLANS
12 (1968) [hereinafter FED. R.EsERVE SYs., REP.]; Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card
Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L REv. 459, 464 (1960).
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the depositary bank with which he has a merchant agreement and
will receive a credit to his account just as if he had deposited cash or
a check. The depositary bank will clear and forward any sales slips
deposited with it through an interchange system in much the same
fashion that checks are cleared. The sales slip will be forwarded to
the issuer to be charged to the account of the cardholder who incurred the obligation to the issuer in the transaction with the merchant. The issuer will then periodically bill its cardholder.
Banks become part of an interchange system by agreeing among
themselves to abide by certain rules and regulations that prescribe
the techniques and conditions under which the interchange process
will operate. These rules and regulations serve the same function for
charge card systems as the rules of the city check clearinghouse associations,8 the Federal Reserve Collection System,9 and article 4 of
the Uniform Commercial Code provide for the check system.
The depositary bank and the issuer may be separated by thousands
of miles, and the interchange clearing process may involve two or more
regional clearing associations and several banks. For example, assume
that an Ithaca, New York resident who is on vacation and who possesses a charge card issued to him by his local bank purchases goods
from a Redding, California merchant who has entered into a merchant agreement with a depositary bank in Redding. The sales slip
generated from that transaction would be deposited by the merchant
in his account in the Redding depositary bank; the depositary bank
would fonvard the sales slip to the western regional charge card association to which it belongs; the western regional association would
transmit the slip to an eastern regional association, which in tum
would forward the slip to the Ithaca issuer for debiting to the cardholder's account.10
This wide-ranging consumer convenience has been made economically feasible by the establishment, within the framework of charge
card systems, of an account for the consumer against which multiple
drawings may be made and by the use of highly advanced technology
in administering such systems. A charge card system must be highly
efficient to exist: the cost per transaction must be low or the public
could not afford to pay for the convenience offered.
8. See note 10 infra.
9. Fed. Reserve Bd. Reg. J, 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-.16 (1970).
10. See generally Coha, Credit Card Pace Accelerates, BANKERS MONTHLY, Oct. 15,
1968, at 21; FED. REsERVE SYs., REP., supra note 7, at 9-10, 24-25; Franklin, Significance
of Interchange for Bank Credit Card Plans, BURROUGHS CLEARING HOUSE, Aug. 1968,
at 28; Stevens, The Expanding Role of Bank Charge Card Associations, BANKING, Nov.
1969, at 47. Clearing can be more involved when correspondent or affiliated banks
are interjected into the process.

Bank Charge Cards
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Costs within the systems may be decreased through economies
that are administrative in nature. Only one review of credit-worthiness need be made-at the time the account is established-in contrast to separate credit inquiries that would have to be made if
separate loans were involved in each transaction. Although several
extensions of credit may have been charged against an account, only
one billing per cycle need be made, thus affording the system the
same operating economies as those achieved in services now offered
to consumers wherein they can consolidate their separate debts. 11
The primary economies, however, are achieved by highly automated data processing systems used in clearing and accounting for
charge card transactions. Such devices as optical scanners, encoders,
readers, and computers are employed so that sales slips can be machine
processed free of the interruption, errors, and high cost attributable
to manual processing. Computers balance accounts automatically between banks, adjust cardholder accounts, and calculate any applicable finance charges; they also analyze rapidly, process, and disseminate information regarding abnormal activity in the use of a charge
card, thereby lowering the potential for financial loss by users and
operators of charge card systems resulting from criminal activity.
The resultant smooth, low-cost flow of machine processable paper is
a prerequisite for this consumer service.12 With rapid developments
in the industry, however, even the sales slip is already becoming an
anachronism because of the expense involved in its processing. Prototype equipment exists that would eliminate the transfer of documents; such equipment will soon allow a charge card transaction to
take place electronically, instantly.13

III.

USE OF CHARGE CARDS HAS PRODUCED
SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC BENEFITS

Bank charge card systems are new: they achieved significant market impact as recently as 1959 with the advent of the BankAmericard.H Master Charge cards followed in 1967. The operations of
11. Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code, 85 BANKING
L.J. 941, 961 (1968); Fm. REsERVE SYs., REP., supra note 7, at 57-58.
12. Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND. &:
COM. L. REv. 485, 513-17 (1966-67).
13. See text accompanying notes 64 &: 65 infra. Examples of the possibilities for
discarding the sales slip are contained in the report of the Special Committee on
Paperless Entries (SCOPE) appointed by the Los Angeles and San Francisco Clearing
House Associations, dated August 24, 1970, and a procedural guide prepared by that
committee. Some of the first applications proposed therein, such as automatic payment
of insurance premiums and utility bills, are already being contemplated as natural
extensions of bank charge card use.
14. Comment, supra note 7, at 462.
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these two major bank charge card interchange systems are now international in scope.15 Banks belonging to the Master Charge interchange system, for instance, number more than 5,000, operating offices in forty-nine states and many foreign countries throughout the
world. 16 Banks issue cards in most of these jurisdictions and merchants in all of them accept the charge card as a medium of exchange
in the same way they accept cash. In the Master Charge system alone,
the merchants that will accept Master Charge cards now number
approximately 625,000 and member banks have outstanding 36 million charge cards.17 During 1970, more than 6.1 billion dollars in
sales in the United States were attributed to all bank charge cards in
more than 320 million separate transactions.18
Bank charge card services have received a truly phenomenal
acceptance by the public in a short period of time. They have been
viewed by many analysts as an innovation that will eventually replace
the use of money or checks as a medium of exchange in consumer
transactions.19 Our present system of cash payment, it is said, will
soon be viewed as being as archaic as the barter system of days gone
by now appears to twentieth century man. Even now it is apparent,
both by virtue of the universal acceptance of bank charge cards and
the advantages of their use, that they are a device of significant utility
to consumers, businessmen, and banks alike.
In the near future, charge cards will be used to actuate electronicinput terminals at retail establishments, thereby eliminating the
costly transfer of documents. 20 Electronic-terminal devices are cur15. See, e.g., Fukushima, Japan Joins the Rush to Credit Cards, BURROUGHS
Cr.EAruNG HousE, Nov. 1968, at 32; Matthews, Franch Succumbs to Credit Card Trend,
BURROUGHS CLEARING HousE, July 1969, at 28; Main Money Cards for UK Residents,
BANKER, Feb. 1970, at 230; Bank Credit Cards Going International, BURROUGHS CLEARING
HousE, Aug. 1968, at 54; New Look in Credit Cards, FINANCIAL WORLD, Jan. 8, 1969,
at 11; San Francisco Chronicle, July 13, 1970, at 18, col. 2.
16. Interbank Card Association, 1970 Fourth Quarter Statistical Summary, on file
at the offices of the Michigan Law Review.
17. Id. Federally insured commercial banks had nearly 60 million credit cards
outstanding at the end of 1969. Hearings pursuant to H.R. Res. 66 Before the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems of the Select Comm. on Small Business,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1970).
18. See note 16 supra; San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 10, 1971, at 59, col. 5.
The number of separate transactions was derived by dividing total amount of sales
revenue by an average transaction amount of $19.
19. See generally Chait, Marketing in the Money Card Society, CALIF. MANAGEMENT
R.Ev., Fall 1968, at 3; Dunne, Variation on a Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposals
for the Uniform Commercial Code and the Checkless Society, 75 YALE L.J. 788 (1966);
Weiss, Automatic Vendor Poises for Credit Card Blast-off, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 17,
1969, at 56; Describes Checkless Society of Future, Impact on Insurance, NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER (Life and Health Insurance ed.), Nov. 2, 1968, at 15.
20. It has been estimated that, in 1967, nearly 20 billion checks were cleared at a
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rently being tested in conjunction with food vending machines, airline reservation and charge systems, and self-service gasoline stations ..
These developments indicate that charge cards will, in the near future, play a principal role in the establishment of an electronic
money-transfer system. It has been predicted that these developments
will lower retail costs to the benefit of everyone.21
Consumers receive the major benefits to be derived from the use
of interchange charge cards. They may carry a single charge card
instead of many cards or money. A consumer using his card internationally is not subjected to the vexations of exchanging currency
as he travels from one country to another; the card in that respect
amounts to an internationally recognized unit of currency. A consumer is also provided with a well-documented record at the end of
every month of goods and services that he has purchased during that
month. Moreover, he need not worry about great personal financial
loss as a result of theft, fire, or other misfortune, which loss would be
a disaster if it involved money, but would be a mere inconvenience
if it involved his charge card.22 Nor need the consumer worry about
the supply of cash in his pocket at a given moment in time as charge
cards become more universally accepted as a medium of exchange.
The consumer need no longer adjust his on-hand cash position daily;
he need only balance his cash position on a cyclical basis, typically
monthly.23
Cardholders seem to view most charge card transactions as replacements for payment in cash. A cardholder expects to receive
goods and services upon presentment of his charge card just as he
would upon presentment of cash, and he expects them upon the same
terms. By using a charge card he is not subject to any of the inconveniences or costs associated with the use of secondary means of payment, such as travelers checks or personal checks, the latter of which
may frequently be unacceptable even in the locality in which the
cardholder resides and most certainly will be unacceptable on a
national or international basis.
cost of almost 4 billion dollars. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1969, at 80, col. 1. See also
Chait, supra note 19, at 3; FED. REsERvE SYs., REP., supra note 7, at 20.
21. Weiss, supra note 19, at 58.
22. Consumer responsibility for loss resulting from unauthorized use of his credit
card is limited by federal legislation, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970), and, in some cases,
state legislation. See, e.g., CAL. C1v. CODE § 1718 (West Supp. 1971): ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 121-1/2, § 381-82 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971).
2!1. Davenport, supra note 11, at 961; FED. REsERvE SYS., REP., supra note 7, at 57-58.

National advertising for both the Bank Americard and Master Charge plans emphasizes the responsible use of the charge card and its utility as a money management
device. .AMEluCAN BANUR, March 10, 1971, at 1, col. 3.
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Merchants also benefit from the acceptance of charge cards and
are willing to treat a charge card transaction as a replacement for
cash payment. They are typically protected by the terms of their
merchant agreements from risks associated with accepting payment in
a noncash form. For instance, they avoid certain risks associated with
the acceptance of a check in payment, such as the risk of forgery or
lack of funds in the purchaser's checking account. 24 The acceptance
of a bank charge card may be even safer than acceptance of cash itself
in that the merchant is also protected from the risk of counterfeit. A
merchant knows that he will receive an immediate credit in his demand deposit account when he deposits a sales slip, just as he would
if he deposited cash. Merchants are also freed from the risk of theft
in a day when crime is increasing. So valued is this feature by some
that certain businesses, which have traditionally been plagued by a
high rate of theft, have begun to accept only correct change or charge
cards during hours of special risk. 25
Finally, in those instances in which the cardholder purchases
goods or services and then decides to exercise his option to repay in
installments, the extension of credit is accomplished more economically than if the merchant had operated his own charge program or if
the bank had extended a series of separate loans to cover the cost of
the goods or services purchased. Such lower costs probably benefit
the consumer in the form of lower prices for the products and services
he purchases.
Such, then, is the business context in which the question arises
whether a consumer should have the right to assert against the bank
that issued his charge card defenses that he may have against a merchant. Because of the recentness and the uniqueness of bank charge
card services, there is little statutory or case law that is directly applicable to the complex relationships that exist among the many
parties to charge card transactions. 26 Such relationships have thus
far been governed primarily by agreement of the parties concerned.
Discussion of the issue, th1..refore, particularly before the judiciary,
has been characterized by attempts to analogize the credit card transaction to similar transactions.27
24. UNIFORM Com.IERCIAL CODE §§ 3-417(2), 3-510, 4-207(2), 4-212 [hereinafter UCC];
See generally H. BAILEY, THE LAw OF BANK CHECKS §§ 12.1, .23, .24 (4th ed. 1969).
25. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1970, at 51, col. 2; The Oil Daily, May 15, 1970,
at 4, col. 5; The Oil Daily, March 17, 1970, at 20, col. 1.
26. Davenport, supra note 11, at 945-47; Bergsten, supra note 12, at 485; Comment,
supra note 7, at 459; Comment, Bank Credit Plans: Innovations in Consumer Financing,
1 LoYoLA (L.A.) L. REv. 49, 50 (1968) [hereinafter Comment, Bank Credit Plans].
27. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 23-40, Brief of Amicus Curiae at 11-16, Payne
v. Filter Queen of Hayward, Inc., Civil No. 384418 (Alameda County Super. Ct. (Cal.),
June 16, 1969), appeal docketed, Civil No. 27751 (Ct. App. Cal., May 13, 1970),
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IV. THE CoNsUMER's PosmoN
A consumer has the ability to assert defenses against a merchant's
attempts to collect amounts due and, therefore, enjoys a tactical advantage if the merchandise or services purchased on credit are unsatisfactory. The merchant must take the initiative; he must seek out
the consumer for payment. If the consumer is forced to take the
initiative to obtain a return of amounts paid, it is argued that he
may not be able to assert effectively his rights against merchants
because he may have insufficient knowledge or resources to do so.
A consumer advocate 28 may recognize the benefits obtainable through
use of charge cards; yet he may view bank charge card transactions
as a replacement for a direct extension of credit by a retail merchant.
Therefore, he would argue that a consumer should possess the same
rights against any party seeking to collect amounts due, whether the
creditor is a merchant or a bank that has issued the consumer a
charge card.
Consumer advocates argue that placing liability on banks will
have the salutary effect of inducing banks to police merchants' activities and that they are in a better position than the consumer to do
so.20 Only financially sound merchants that sell high quality goods
and services will be allowed to accept bank charge cards, and consumers will thereby have merchants screened on their behalf. Consumers will therefore presumably enjoy protection from any defect
in merchandise purchased, from the bad faith of the merchant in
settling a dispute, and from the merchant's insolvency. Moreover,
the mere association of the names and service marks of prestigious
banks and their charge cards gives consumers a sense of confidence
in the merchants accepting the bank charge cards, and banks should
justify that expectation. Finally, the consumer advocate can rely on
the seemingly irrefutable premise that banks can better absorb or
spread losses than can individual consumers.
Unscrupulous merchants have used various techniques to place
on consumers the onus of taking the initiative to resolve any dispute.
These techniques have included the assignment to a related third
party of the consumer's obligation to the merchant or the negotiation
to a third party of a negotiable instrument executed by the consumer.
Such techniques have clearly been used in some instances to deny the
28. As used in this Article, "consumer advocate" refers not only to those persons
who have presented the consumer's position in the courts and the legislatures, but
also to those who have presented it-possibly in a more objective manner-in law
review articles.
29. See Note, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from High Risk
Credit Buyers in Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 14
UCLA L. R.Ev. 879, 899-900 n.83 (1967).
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consumer the ability effectively to assert defenses that he may have
against a merchant. Such an assignment or negotiation would, in
most jurisdictions, free the holder of the obligation from defenses as
either an assignee for value30 or a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.31
Legislatures have taken steps to deprive merchants of these techniques for compelling consumers to bring an affirmative action by
interjecting third parties into the merchant-consumer transaction.82
Simultaneously, courts, at a pace that has varied from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, have been developing theories to support the proposition that a consumer may assert defenses against certain parties who
were not sellers, but who hold a promise to pay resulting from a
consumer transaction and possess certain special relationships to the
sales transaction. 33 It is now being argued, before both judicial and
legislative forums, that a consumer's rights in credit transactions
should not depend on the form in which the credit is extended and
that the consumer should be able to assert against any related party
attempting to collect the debt created in a consumer credit transaction defenses he has against the seller. Consumer advocates suggest
that the charge card transaction is in reality tantamount to an assignment for value to the bank of the consumer's obligation to the merchant. Characterizing the transaction in accordance with this "assignment theory,'' 34 they would argue that the credit card sale should be
subject to the same doctrines that are being used to penetrate the
holder-in-due-course and assignee-for-value defenses in other consumer credit transactions.
The developing doctrines are numerous, but a brief examination
of two will be sufficient to demonstrate the foundations upon which
they are built. The most prominent of these doctrines is that of denying assignee-for-value or holder-in-due-course status to a financing
institution that is too closely connected with the seller's business
operations or with the particular sale at issue.85 A consumer advocate
30. This doctrine assumes a waiver of such defenses by the consumer in favor of
any assignee, a common feature in a sales contract involving consumer credit. St!e
Navin, Waivf!r of Defense Clauses in Consumer Contracts, 48 N.C. L. REv. 505, 508
(1970).
31. ucc § 3-305.
32. See generally B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEcISLATION 312-22 (1965).
33. See Navin, supra note 30; Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Dt!fenses: Plugging
the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U. L REv. 272 (1969).
34. See generally Bergsten, supra note 12, at 509-13; Comment, supra note 7, at 459.
35. See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. IOI, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Commercial
Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
The principle to be gleaned from the "close connection" cases seems to be
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would point to many indicia of a close business relationship between
a bank and a merchant participating in a charge card program. The
bank typically maintains a demand deposit account on behalf of the
merchant and provides the merchant with machine processable sales
slips of uniform size and content, advertising and other promotional
material for the charge card program, an imprinter, and applications
that customers can use to obtain charge cards. The bank regularly
accepts for deposit sales slips generated in charge card transactions.
In the case of many merchants, particularly small businessmen, it
can be argued that no credit sales whatsoever would have been made
in the absence of the bank charge card service because the small businessman simply would have insufficient resources to operate a credit
plan.
A related theory that is used to deny the status of an assignee
for value or a holder in due course in consumer credit cases is that of
knowledge, on the part of the assignee or holder, of the defect in the
underlying sales transaction that gives rise to the consumer defense.36
Both a theory based on knowledge and a theory based on close connection accomplish the same purpose, but the burden of proof to be
borne by the consumer is substantially less if a close-connection doctrine is accepted. All that need be proved in the latter instance is
the business relationship; the subjection of the holder to consumer
defenses follows as a direct consequence. The consumer advocate would argue that a cardholder who can show that the bank had
knowledge of the defect in his transaction that gives rise to a defense
should, consistent with the assignment theory, be able to assert that
defense against the bank. Realistically, the number of cases in which
a consumer can make such a showing will probably be small since a
theory based on knowledge may require that the consumer prove that
the relationship between the bank and the merchant resulted in
actual knowledge of the facts constituting the consumer defense. In
that regard a battle has been fought for some time on the issue
whether the proper test for such knowledge is an objective or subthat a financer will not be subject to defenses unless he is involved to a significant
degree in controlling the sales transaction itself or has some unusual contact with the
merchant or the sales transaction. See generally Littlefield, supra note 33, at 275-77;
Comment, Judicial and Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a "Holder in Due
Course" in Consumer Transactions, 11 B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. R.Ev. 90, 99 (1969). This
concept forms the theoretical basis for § 2.407 of the NCA, entitled "Interlocking
Loans and Sales," which subjects creditors to claims and defenses of the consumer if
the creditor "participated in or was connected with" the sale.

36. See Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the
Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966).
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jective one.s1 The resolution of this question is important since the
application of one test or the other would frequently mean a difference between success and failure for the consumer's cause.ss
In at least one instance known to the authors, consumer advocates
have argued that banks should be subject to liability for merchants'
wrongs under a negligence theory.so Such a theory proceeds from the
premise that the merchant would not have been able to enter into
the consumer transaction at issue absent the culpability of the bank
in allowing his participation in a charge card plan; that it is the duty
of the bank to investigate a merchant to insure that he is not engaging in questionable practices before allowing him to participate; and
that if no investigation is conducted or if it is conducted negligently,
the bank should be responsible to the consumer for the ensuing loss.
Lender liability under arguably comparable circumstances is not unknown. The California supreme court, for instance, has held that a
savings and loan association that provided financing to a contractor
for the construction of residential housing could be held liable to
home purchasers for defective construction.40
A variation of the negligence theory would find a duty to allow
the easily identifiable service marks associated with major charge
card plans to be displayed only by merchants that have been thoroughly investigated. It has been argued that the display of the service
mark places the bank in the position of an endorser. Such was found
to be the case when it was held that the owners of the Good Housekeeping Seal could be liable to a consumer who had suffered injury
while using a product under circumstances where the Seal appeared
on the product or in advertising for the product.41
This Article will not attempt to deal with a negligence theory,
however, since the theory deviates significantly in its theoretical basis,
in the remedy proposed, and in its potential for acceptance from
those theories reiating to the denial of the status of an assignee for
value or holder in due course.42 A negligence theory would not oper37. See cases cited in Littlefield, supra note 36.
38. See Littlefield, supra note 36.
39. Brief for Appellants, supra note 27, at 32-40.
40. Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn., 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968). The Connor doctrine received an inhospitable reception in California. The legislature subsequently limited the doctrine, CAL. Cxv. ConE § 3434 (West
Supp. 1970), and even the judiciary itself seemed to retrench as minor factual distinctions from the facts present in Connor were seized upon to reject the applicability of
the Connor analysis. See Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
41. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969). See
also Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971).
42. See generally Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural
Defects in New Housing, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 739, 750, 755 (1968).
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ate merely to prevent the cutting off of consumer defenses. Rather
than providing a shield from the bank's attempts to collect money
due resulting from an ability to assert defenses to collection, a negligence theory would operate as a sword by which persons might hold
banks liable for personal injury or property damage caused by defective products. Furthermore, given the nature of multiparty charge
card interchange systems, a negligence rule would work a curious
result. It would not allow the consumer to assert defenses against
the bank seeking to collect on the underlying obligation. The bank
that would bear the duty arising from a negligence theory of liability
would be the depositary bank, which usually would not be the institution seeking to collect amounts due. Hence, such a theory represents a separate and distinct development in consumer law outside
the scope of this discussion.
V.

THE

CREDITOR'S POSITION

While a consumer advocate views a bank charge card transaction
as different from a direct extension of credit by a merchant in form
only and would advocate a complete disregard of that difference, a
creditor advocate43 would hasten to point out that more than differences in form are at issue. He would note that significant differences exist in the relationships and expectations of the parties to a
multiparty charge card transaction in contrast to typical direct credit
extensions by a merchant in which the obligation is later assigned
or negotiated to third parties.
While the consumer's position rests on the assignment theory
discussed above, 44 the creditor advocate would maintain that the
assignment theory is simply not applicable to bank charge card
plans.45 As described above,46 no obligation is created on the part of
the cardholder to pay the merchant in a charge card transaction. The
cardholder's obligation to pay for the goods or services purchased
arises solely out of the cardholder agreement and accrues solely to
43. The term "creditor advocate," like "consumer advocate" (see note 28 supra)
will be given an expanded definition in this Article to include those persons who have
presented the creditor's position in law reviews as well as in the courts and legislatures.
44. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
45. This is not to say that the assignment theory is never used. Because local laws
in some jurisdictions would not permit, as a practical matter, structuring of bank
charge card transactions as direct obligations to the issuer, banks have been forced
under some circumstances to adopt unwieldy procedures under which they are assigned
"sales contracts." Such a situation existed in Utah, for example, where banks operated
charge card programs under the state's revolving charge agreement provisions until
Utah enacted the UCCC in 1969. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-l-101 to -9-103 (Supp. 1969).
46. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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the issuer. Hence, the merchant has no obligation to assign. 47 The
merchant does not evaluate the credit risk involved, assumes no
credit risk, and sets no terms upon which credit is granted. To the
contrary, he typically has knowledge of none of the terms of the
agreement between his customer and the issuer, such as the terms of
repayment, length of the free period, deferred-payment schedule,
and finance charges. These terms are set forth solely in the agreement
between the cardholder and the issuer. The merchant's relationship
to the customer is only that of a seller of goods and services, and his
responsibility relates only to the quantity and quality of those goods
and services.
It is the issuer, frequently thousands of miles distant from the
transaction, that sets the terms upon which credit may be obtained,
that conducts an initial evaluation of the charge card applicant to
determine whether to issue a card, and that conducts an on-going
review of the account status. It is the issuer, not the merchant, that
assumes the business risks associated with the extension of credit.
A "direct obligation" theory,48 then, the creditor advocate
would urge, best describes the nature of a multiparty charge card
transaction since it recognizes that the cardholder's obligation that
is created on the making of a purchase is one owed "directly" to the
issuer of the card in accordance with the terms of the cardholder
agreement. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, for instance, implicitly adopts this theory by placing bank charge card transactions
in the category of direct loans by financial institutions to consumers.411
Consistent with the direct-obligation theory is the creditor advocate's analogy of charge card transactions to letter-of-credit transactions, which are governed by article 5 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.rm The multiparty bank charge card transaction appears to be a
47. Comment, supra note 7, at 499. This assumes a charge card plan that is not
specifically structured to accord with an assignment theory.
48. See generally Bergsten, supra note 12, at 509-1!1; Comment, supra note 7, at 459.
49. UCCC §§ 1.301(9), 3.106(3). The Federal Reserve :Board came to much the same
conclusion in characterizing only the bank, not the merchant, as a creditor in a bank
charge card transaction. The merchant is not even viewed as an arranger of credit,
much less a creditor, by federal truth-in-lending regnlations. Fed. Reserve Bd. Reg.
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(£) (1970). Section 2.407 of the NCA, while reaching a different
result than the UCCC, does not appear to dispute this basic premise. It simply includes some direct-loan transactions in the category of credit sales in which the
consumer will have a right to assert product related defenses against a creditor. See
note 2 supra.
50. See generally Davenport, supra note 11, at 963; Comment, supra note 7, at 472;
Comment, The Applicability of the Law of Letters of Credit to Modem Bank Card
Systems, 18 KAN. L. REv. 871 (1970) [hereinafter Comment, Letters of Credit].

May 1971]

Bank Charge Cards

1047

hybrid of the traveler's or "clean" letter of credit and the commercial or documentary letter of credit, although it more closely resembles the latter.151
A commercial letter-of-credit transaction typically involves three
parties: issuer, customer-buyer, and seller-beneficiary.152 The rights
and obligations of these parties are defined by three separate and
independent agreements between buyer and seller, buyer and issuer,
and issuer and seller.153 Under the terms of a letter of credit, the issuer
engages that it will accept the seller's drafts drawn on the issuer, conditioned upon the seller's tender of document specified by the buyer.
The buyer agrees to reimburse the issuer for the amounts of the
drafts so presented.
In relying on the letter of credit, the seller-beneficiary looks to
the credit of the issuer instead of that of the unknown buyer and
typically has no knowledge of the terms of the reimbursement agreement between the buyer and the issuer. In accepting the seller's
draft, the issuer must insist on the specified documentation, but it
is not required to concern itself with the underlying sales transaction.
Once the issuer has accepted the draft, the buyer is obligated directly
to the issuer to pay the amount of the draft, regardless of how the
contract of sale is performed by the seller.54 Even when only one
bank, having contact with both the seller and buyer, is involved in
51. The cash advance feature of bank charge card plans, whereby cash may be
obtained directly at the offices of member banks upon presentation of the charge card,
performs the identical function of the traveler's letter of credit. Davenport, supra
note 11, at 964-65.
52. A letter-of-credit transaction may also involve a fourth party, the confirming
bank, which is located in the area in which the seller-beneficiary is domiciled. The
confirming bank is instructed by the issuer to hold itself out to the seller as being
responsible for the seller's drafts drawn in accordance with the credit. See W. WARD
8: H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 25-26 (4th ed. 1958). In this respect,
the confirming bank performs the function of the depositary bank in charge card
transactions.
53. See generally W. WARD 8: H. HARFIELD, supra note 52, at 21-35; H. FINKEISrEIN,
LEGAL AsPEcrs OF COMMERCIAL I.EITERS OF CREDIT (1930); Davenport, supra note 11,
at 963-77; Comment, Letters of Credit, supra note 50, at 875-77.
54. UCC § 5-114(1) provides: "An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment
which complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods
or documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between
the customer and the beneficiary••••" UCC § 5-109(1) states:
An issuer's obligation to its customer includes good faith and observance of any
general banking usage but unless otherwise agreed does not include liability or
responsibility
(a) for performance of the underlying contract for sale or other transaction
between the customer and the beneficiary; or
(b) for any act or omission of any person other than itself or its own branch
See also W. WARD 8: H. HAilFn:LD, supra note 52, at 47-48.
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the letter-of-credit transaction, letter-of-credit law has long recognized
that it would be impracticable to embroil the issuer in buyer-seller
disputes. 55
The similarities between bank charge cards and letters of credit
are striking,56 and creditor advocates have resorted to this analogy.
The cardholder agreement performs the function of the customerissuer agreement and requires the cardholder to reimburse the issuer
for sales slips honored, provided certain conditions are met. The
letter of credit itself is the agreement between issuer and beneficiary,
and the combination of the charge card and the merchant agreement
serves the same purpose in setting forth the terms under which sales
slips will be accepted. 57 The sales slip would seem to satisfy the definition of "a documentary draft or documentary demand for payment" in article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code.58
Not only is the nature of the various obligations of the parties in
a letter-of-credit transaction strikingly similar to that in the bank
charge card transaction, the purpose for which both modes of payment were created-substitution of the promise to pay of a recognized financial institution for that of the unknown customer-is
precisely the same. Creditor advocates would argue that minor differences in these two methods of payment should not be allowed to
obscure their important similarity: in both, the cardholder-custom55. H. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 53, at 223-49; w. WARD &: H. HARFIELD, supra note
52, at 50-52. See Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E.
636 (1925); Laudisi v. American Exch. Natl. Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924).
But see Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
56. Davenport, supra note 11, at 967; Comment, Letters of Credit, supra note 50,
at 875-79. Section 1.301(9) of the UCCC recognizes this similarity by providing:

"'Lender credit card or similar arrangement' means an arrangement or loan agreement ••• pursuant to which a lender gives a debtor the privilege of using a credit
card, letter of credit, or other credit confirmation ••••" (emphasis added).
57. See Comment, Letters of Credit, supra note 50, at 877.
58. UCC § 5-102(1) provides:
This Article applies
(a) to a credit issued by a bank if the credit requires a documentary draft or
a documentary demand for payment; and
(b) to a credit issued by a person other than a bank if the credit requires that
the draft or demand for payment be accompanied by a document of title;
and
(c) to a credit issued by a bank or other person if the credit is not within
subparagra:phs (a) or (b) but conspicuously states that it is a letter of credit
or 1s conspicuously so entitled.
UCC § 5-103(b) provides:
A "documentary draft" or a "documentary demand for payment" is one honor of
whiclI is conditioned upon the presentation of a document or documents. "Document" means any paper including document of title, security, invoice, certificate,
notice of default and the like.
See Comment, Letters of Credit, supra note 50, at 882-83.
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er's obligation flows directly to the issuer and is independent of the
underlying sales transaction. 59
The principles developed in letter-of-credit transactions throughout the years confirm that notice of infirmities in the underlying sale
transaction, whether they be questions of breach of warranty or fraud
in the inducement, should not affect the customer's obligation to its
issuer. 00 To hold otherwise would require banks to become experts in
the quality and custom of hundreds of thousands of types of goods that
are purchased with letters of credit, or bank charge cards, and to
become involved in as many disputes. The issuer would be required,
upon receipt of notice from its customer of an alleged defense, to act
as an arbitrator in any dispute between customer and merchant-an
onerous and expensive duty. It is a fundamental premise of such
transactions that the bank ought not to concern itself with the quality of merchandise or standards of performance, but only with the
financial aspects of the transaction as they appear from documentation. 61
Another analogy consistent with the direct-obligation theory to
which creditor advocates resort is that of the personal check. In
many respects charge card systems are functionally related to the
check system. Under a bank charge card system the depositary bank
furnishes the merchant with deposit forms and sales slips, documents
upon which the fund transfer is recorded. The same bank furnishes
the merchant with deposit forms and its customers with checks,
which also serve to record the fund transfer when payment is made
by check. The merchant itemizes charge card transaction sales slips
on a deposit form and deposits them at his depositary bank where
the amounts are credited to his checking account. He also itemizes
checks on a deposit slip and deposits them with the same bank,
which credits the amounts to the same account. The depositary bank
forwards the sales slips through the charge card clearing system and
is reimbursed by the issuer. Similarly, the merchant's depositary
bank forwards checks through the check clearing system to the
payor-drawee bank, which reimburses the depositary bank. The issuer receives sales slips chargeable to its cardholder's charge card,
59. Commentators have recognized the significance of the cardholder's direct promise
to pay the issuer, irrespective of claims or defenses against the merchant: "It thus
appears that the bank has an absolute right to receive payment from the cardholder
for all purchases made with the card." Comment, Bank Credit Plans, supra note 26,
at 60. See Davenport, supra note 11, at 974-75.
60. See note 55 supra.
61. Laudisi v. American Exch. Natl. Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N~. 347 (1924).
This principle has been codified in UCC § 5-114(2).
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and if such slips are properly completed, charges the amount thereof
to the cardholder's account. The drawee bank receives checks drawn
on its customer's account, and if properly drawn, the amounts are
charged to the drawer-customer's account in accordance with the
drawer-drawee agreement.
The relationship between the drawee bank and the customer
may also involve an extension of credit if, for example, the drawee
bank makes available a "check reserve" or "check credit" plan to
its customers. Under such plans, the drawee extends a line of credit
to the customer against which the customer may draw by writing
checks that would otherwise overdraw his checking account. 62 In
many of these plans ordinary checks are used. The customer repays
amounts in excess of those on deposit according to the check reserve agreement in the same manner that a cardholder would pay
the issuer in a charge card plan; the customer has the option of
repaying the total amount when billed or making payments according to a deferred-payment schedule.63
When a check reserve plan is involved, the check system of payment is difficult to distinguish functionally from the charge card
system. The merchant views both systems as simply a form of payment and is not concerned with the particular arrangement between
his customer and the issuer or drawee bank. When a check is presented, the merchant has no way of knowing whether the customer
has funds in his account against which the check will be charged,
or whether the check will create an overdraft that will actuate a
"loan" by the drawee to the customer pursuant to a check reserve
plan. Moreover, if such a loan is made, the merchant will have no
knowledge of the terms of repayment under the check reserve plan.
Precisely the same situation exists in a charge card transaction-the
merchant does not know whether a deferred payment will be elected
by the cardholder on billing or not.
The idea that banks that process checks should be held liable
for events occuring in an underlying purchase of goods or services
would seem ludicrous, even if a loan under a check reserve plan
were part of the transaction, but that is because checks have been
accepted for many years as a form of payment and are subject to
well-developed rules of law. The principles applicable to checks
62. Even absent the formal creation of such a credit arrangement, an ordinary checking account may involve the extension of credit. If a check creates an overdraft in a
customer's account, the bank has the option of dishonoring it and returning it to the
depositary bank, or of charging the amount against its customer's account and recovering from the customer. UCC § 4-401(1).
63. See generally Fm. R.EsERvE SYs., REP., supra note 7, at 22-23.
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were developed with a view toward providing a convenient, safe
form of payment beneficial to a wide range of users. Charge cards
are now supplanting checks as a form of payment. Creditor advocates feel that the similarities in function between check and charge
card systems argue for a similarity in the legal obligations and rights
of the parties involved.
Further, the coming of the checkless and cashless society will involve a shift from the check or document system to an electronictransfer system. It has been envisaged that in such a system the
customer will transmit directly to the payor bank or issuer an order
that a specified amount be transferred from the customer's account
to the account of the merchant from whom the customer is purchasing goods or services. The "order" will be transmitted via electronic
impulse initiated at a terminal in the merchant's establishment. The
merchant will be paid at the instant of the cardholder's order transmittal by means of a credit to his account; the cardholder's account
will be debited at the same time. 64
The concept of a direct order by the cardholder to the issuer
through the use of a combination of the charge card and electronic
terminal emphasizes the fact that documentation at the merchant
level can easily be by-passed in the charge card system. An assignment
theory becomes even more patently inapplicable to the charge card
system when direct electronic transfers are used since then there will
be no document for the merchant to negotiate or assign. The transfers from one account to the other will be the direct consequence of
an order by the cardholder to the issuer, with the merchant interested only in the ultimate result. 65
The functional concept of the direct electronic transmission of
an order from cardholder to issuer and the legal concept of a direct
obligation flowing from cardholder to issuer are mutually reinforcing. The direct-obligation theory seems not only to provide
the legal framework most descriptive of charge card transactions as
they are now taking place, but it also seems to hold the most promise
for providing a realistic legal framework within which the commer64. The terminal could be actuated by a charge card, and it has been suggested
that, eventually, the input to the issuer may be initiated merely by the customer's voice.
See generally Dunne, Variation on a Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposals for the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Checkless Society, 75 YALE L.J. 788, 793 (1966).
65. A variation of such a paperless transaction is that contemplated by the SCOPE
report, note 13 supra. Under such a plan merchants, such as utilities, would be preauthorized by a consumer regularly to charge against the consumer's checking account.
As pointed out above, such a transaction could easily result in an extension of credit,
without the knowledge of the merchant, and, perhaps, without knowledge of the
consumer.
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cial-payment mechanism can undergo a smooth transition from a
document system to an electronic-transfer system.
Not only does the direct-obligation theory espoused by creditor
advocates call for banks to be free from involvement with the underlying sales transaction, practical considerations peculiar to multiparty charge card transactions dictate that same result. As was indicated earlier,66 the roles of issuer and depositary bank are usually
occupied by different banks. In a high percentage of charge card
transactions, the banks may not be located in the same geographic
part of the United States; 67 in a not insignificant number of transactions they may even be located in different countries. 68 The issuer
-the party against which defenses would be asserted-typically will
have no knowledge of and no contact with the merchant honoring
the charge card and, therefore, will have no way of evaluating that
merchant's performance or his financial status or anything else
about him. Hence, even if the premise of the assignment theory
were accepted arguendo, arguments concerning the quantity or
quality of knowledge or contact under the close-connection and
knowledge theories articulated above become tenuous at best in most
transactions.
Nor would an issuer, thousands of miles removed from the merchant, have the ability to gather such information if a duty to
evaluate merchants were imposed. Businesses accepting multiparty
charge cards deal in literally millions of products and services and
utilize widely varying sales techniques. Businessmen honoring such
cards are dispersed nationally and internationally in jurisdictions
having different business and legal standards. There is no existing
institution inside or outside the banking community that is in a
position to make nation- or world-wide investigations and qualitative determinations regarding each and every product, service, and
business practice that is or may be defective or abusive. To require
a subjective evaluation of business practices and products on such
a grand scale and with a view to varying standards, a task no agency
has ever accomplished or could possibly hope to accomplish, would
be to impose an impossible duty on banks issuing charge cards.
66. See text accompanying notes 7 &: 9 supra.
67. Western States Bankcard Association, a regional interchange association for the
Master Charge system in seven western states, indicates that twenty-five per cent of all
items processed involve an issuer or depositary bank that is not located in the western
region of the United States. This does not take into account items upon which appear,
for example, an issuer located in Los Angeles and a depositary bank located in San
Francisco. Western States Bankcard Association, Significant Statistics Report, on file in
the offices of the Michigan Law Review.
68. See San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 10, 1971, at 59, col. 5.
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Furthermore, even if an issuer had reason to believe that a particular merchant had engaged in unsavory practices or sold goods
or services that were not of high quality, it would have no way of
preventing that merchant from accepting its charge cards. In order
to protect itself, an issuer would have to join with the depositary
hank that enabled the merchant to accept slips, and all other banks
that might potentially enter into such a relationship with the merchant, to refuse jointly to deal with the merchant. Such conduct-a
concerted refusal to deal-would likely be a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. 69 The fact that such concerted action may have been
taken to protect consumers has been held to provide no defense
under the antitrust laws.70
Even depositary banks know little of the business practices or
the quality of the merchandise sold by the tens of thousands of
merchants with which they enter into depositary arrangements. The
insignificance of any individual merchant's activities in relation to
the total anticipated profit from all charge card transactions would
not warrant a continuing investigation of the merchant as a matter
of course. Merchants offer an almost infinite variety of goods and
services. A bank cannot develop an expertise in all such areas and
it would thus be unrealistic to expect a bank to monitor the practices of the merchants that accept bank charge cards. It would be
as unfair and unrealistic to expect a depositary bank to make such
an investigation of a merchant who had an agreement enabling him
to accept charge cards as it would be of a merchant who maintained
nothing more than an ordinary checking account with the bank.
Creditor advocates also note another practical problem if defenses were assertable against issuers. A cardholder-obligor could
simply make allegations of dissatisfaction with the goods or services
he received, whether or not the allegations were well founded, and
refuse to pay debts he incurred directly to the issuer. The issuer
might be located thousands of miles from the scene where the purchase took place. It would not be familiar with the substance of the
transaction, nor with the local laws or business practices that control
the transaction. To conduct an investigation to determine the facts
would be prohibitively expensive.71 To avoid being placed in an
untenable position, the issuer might insist in advance upon an ar69. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1959).
70. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People's Gas, Light &: Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 656-68
(1961); Fashion Originator's Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). See
Orrick, Trade Associations Are Boycott Prone-Bid Depositories as a Case Study, 19
liAsnNGs L.J. 505, 516-18 (1968); N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1969, at 57, col. 6.
71. See Bergsten, supra note 12, at 515-17.
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rangement whereby it could charge back through the various clearing
steps to the depositary bank any sales slips over which a dispute
arose. The depositary bank would presumably then charge back such
a sales slip to the merchant from which it originated. As a practical
matter, every sales slip upon which an obligor chose not to make
payment would then be charged back so long as he made representations that on their face would constitute a defense to an action to
collect the amounts owed.
Such a system would shatter the legitimate expectations of merchants. If the sales slip were charged back to him, the merchant
would have nothing except a sales slip. The consumer would have
the merchandise involved in the transaction and an asserted defense
of unknown validity to the obligation to pay for the merchandise.
Merchants should not be left in such a position with little effective
recourse.
The merchant could not rely on the banks as an intermediary
under such a charge-back rule. Unlike the situation in which a
single financing institution is involved in the transaction, the issuer
in a multiparty charge card transaction has no incentive to become
involved in a cardholder-merchant dispute if it may rid itself of
the troublesome sales slip by charging it back.72 If a single financial
institution is involved, it must be sensitive to the claims of both its
merchant and its debtor, since it desires a continuing relationship
with both. The bank in such a case is likely to promote an accommodation between the parties. This is not the case for the New York
issuer whose cardholder refuses to pay for merchandise purchased
from a California merchant. His goals are cardholder satisfaction
and minimal costs, both of which can be achieved by charging back
immediately at the first sign of a refusal to pay, without bothering to
examine the merits of the dispute.
Given the merchant's vulnerability to any alleged dispute, creditor advocates could point to the potential for unfairness if defenses
were assertable in all transactions. Consumer advocates focus on
the harm caused by the unscrupulous merchant, but no less harm
may befall the innocent merchant who becomes the victim of the
unscrupulous consumer who learns that payments for purchases can
be ignored once he raises an alleged defense and refuses to pay his
issuer. Even assuming a good faith, but erroneous, dispute, the
merchant is left with lost merchandise and little recourse. In most
72. Curiously, if defenses are not assertable against an issuer as a matter of right,
and if no charge-back right exists, a bank will have an interest in maintaining cardholder satisfaction and may very well assist the cardholder in reaching some accommodation.
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situations, a merchant does not choose his customers; the customers
choose his establishment. A consumer has the opportunity to do
business or not to do business with a merchant, as he sees fit. If
proper payment is tendered, which includes, of course, the use of a
charge card, a merchant does not have such an opportunity; he must
do business with the consumer. The merchant relies on the promise
of the bank to pay, not that of the cardholder. Creditor advocates
maintain that to destroy that reliance-the basis upon which charge
cards are accepted-by a rule that would result in a charge back
of the transaction by the bank, which charge back could, as a practical matter, take place at the whim of the cardholder, could greatly
diminish the utility of the bank charge card and its acceptance as a
medium of exchange.

VI. A

NEW PROPOSAL

So much for the arguments now being advocated. The consumer
advocate's argument is attractive as a way to improve the lot of
the individual consumer, but it ignores significant facts in its analogies and conclusions. Moreover, the social consequences may actually be adverse to consumers as a class as well as to others. The
creditor advocate's argument is difficult to rebut for its technical
validity, but it fails to take into account new perceptions concerning
the relationship of consumers to those who provide them with goods
and services. Intense pressure is being brought to bear by consumer
advocates on courts and legislatures to extend additional protection
to consumers. A recent bill proposed by Senator Proxmire, for instance, would allow cardholders to assert defenses against issuers in
all transactions. 73 The issue is waiting to be resolved. A preliminary
73. Section 169 of the proposed Fair Credit Billing Act represents an interesting
study in the development of legal principles in this area. S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 169 (1971). That section represents a new incursion into an area of the law previously left to the states. Senator Proxmire appears to be concerned about the effect
on consumer rights of introducing a third party financer into consumer credit transactions, but he reaches a form of consumer credit that accounts for less than ten per
cent of the total. 57 FEDERAL REsERVE BuLL. A54-55 (1971); Hearings pursuant to H.R.
Res. 66 Before the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems of the Select Comm.
on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1970).
Thirty jurisdictions have made some inroads against financer insulation from defenses. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.10.140 (1962), § 45.50.541 (Supp. 1970); ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT.
ANN. § 44-290 (1956), § 44-5005 (Supp. 1970); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1804.1-.2, 2983.5, .7
(West Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. R.Ev. § 42-136 (Supp. 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§§ 4302, 4311-12, 4342 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 520.74, .80, .88 (Supp. 1971);
HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. §§ 476-18, -36 (1968); ch. 299, § 2.404, [1971] Idaho Acts; ILL. STAT.
ANN. ch. 121-½, §§ 262D, 517-18, 576-77 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-507 (Supp. 1970); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3481, 3724 (Supp. 1970); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 147, 153D(f) (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 255, § 12c (1968),
ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1970), ch. 255B, § 20 (Supp. 1970), ch. 255D, § 25A (Supp. 1970);
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step in the resolution process must be to identify the forum most
able to fashion a workable rule on the issue.

A. The Problem Is Not Susceptible of Judicial Solution
The judicial system is not in a position to articulate a rule on
the issue of the assertability of consumer defenses that will serve
well the parties to bank charge card transactions. Courts must face
such issues in the context of a particular fact situation as cases come
before them. They are not given the opportunity adequately to consider the generalized experience in such transactions. The consumer
advocate will, of course, choose as a case to advance his theory one
that will have facts most appealing to a court. That case, however,
may reflect a situation that is statistically insignificant and result in
a rule adequate for that case but inadequate to govern the vast
majority of cases.
In addition to being forced to consider issues of general applicability in the context of possibly unique factual constraints, the
judicial process does not lend itself to a full development and exposure of data necessary to analyze the ramifications of such a problem. A legislature may wish to determine whether any harm is
actually suffered by consumers as a class under the current law. It
may also wish to inquire whether a charge card program is profitable to banks, for if it were shown that it is not, or that it is
only marginally profitable, the legislature may not wish to impose
further liabilities that could extinguish the infant consumer service.74
Information should also be gathered on the present practices of
banks in evaluating and monitoring a merchant's practices and
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.864-.865, 455.1206-.1208, 492.114 (1967); MISs. CoDE
ANN. § 8075-13 (Supp. 1970); Mo. REv. STAT. § 408.260 (1969); NEV. REv. STAT. § 97.275
(Supp. 1967); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 361-A:7 (VIII) (1966), §§ 320:21-a, :21-b (Supp.
1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16C-38, •64 to -64.3 (1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-15-7(1)
(1962), § 50-16-5 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw §§ 302.9, .12, 403 (McKinney Supp.
1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-13-02(18) (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 2•403, -404
(Supp. 1970); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 83.150, .650, .670(5) (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69,
§ 615(F)-(G) (1965), tit. 69, §§ 1401-02 (Supp. 1971), tit. 69, § 1909 (Supp. 1971), tit.
73, §§ 500-206 to -208 (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 6-28•6 (1969), § 6-27-5
(Supp. 1970); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, §§ 6.05, .o7, 7.07-.08 (1971); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 70B-2-403, -404 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2355(1), 2405(0),
2455 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 63.14.020, .150, .154 (Supp. 1970).
Full coverage of the ordinary credit sale involving an assignment would be the
next logical development, but § 169 ignores that issue and protects consumer defenses
in only multiparty transactions, perhaps the most difficult rule to justify. The legislative proposal may be explainable, however, as supplemental to a proposed FTC rule
on consumer defenses (see notes 4 supra and 85 infra).
74. See Bunting Says Profit Lag in Bank Cards Nears Crisis Stage, AMERICAN BANKER,
April 7, 1971, at 1, col. l; 1970 Losses for Bank Cards Top $115.5 Mil., Over 50%
Higher Than '69, AMERICAN BANK.ER, March 29, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
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financial status, and on the practicalities of placing more onerous burdens on banks.
In weighing the relevant factors, the decisionmaker would have
to place on either side of the scales the social benefits and social
detriments to be derived from the present state of the law and
compare them to those resulting if the state of law were altered as
urged. A careful quantification is essential so that undue emphasis
is not placed on factors present in a given case that may be unique
or statistically insignificant in the universe of transactions that the
proposed rule would govern. Such a quantification assumes the
collection of massive data. Legislatures are clearly better equipped to
undertake the necessary data-gathering effort than are courts, which
must, in general, rely on data presented by the parties.75
In addition, the nature of the judicial process makes it difficult
for a court to articulate a rule than can have the hard, precise
delimitations of statutory language. A legislature might choose to
extend liability concepts only under restricted circumstances, such
as will be suggested below, or it might choose to provide consumer
protection by attacking the complained-of transaction directly. 76 A
court does not have such a capability.
The role of the judiciary with regard to consumer protection
has changed in the last decade. In the past, courts were justly concerned that consumers could not look to their legislators to protect
75. Congress has taken an initial step to accumulate such data. It is the understanding of the authors that the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs has circulated a questionnaire to
the bank charge card industry, requesting information relative to billing practices of
issuers.
The National Commission on Consumer Finance, established by § 401 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 164 (1968), in its REPORT ON CURRENT STUDY
PROJEcrs, released on March 18, 1971, noted that
Since much of the information needed for its studies has been unavailable or in
unusable form, the Commission has launched several data collection projects of
its own •••• Traditionally, consumer credit legislation has focused on a specific
problem with the idea of correction, modification, or outright change. Legislation
has often been proposed on the basis of assumptions despite the fact that few if
any facts are available on the potential effects of proposals. But this Commission,
from the data it gathers, will try to assess the many variables that affect any
changes in the " .•• functioning and structure of the consumer finance industry."
Such assessments should provide a basis for legislative bodies, both state and national, to predict with better accuracy the effect on credit grantors and users of
proposed laws and regulations relating to consumer credit.
NATIONAL Coll!MISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, REPORT ON CURRENT STUDY PROJECIS 1-2
(1971), on file in the offices of the Michigan Law Review.
76. Sales made by door-to-door sslesmen frequently result in consumer complaints,
for instance. Some legislatures have provided for special relief in such sales. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-5005 (Supp. 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-136 (Supp.
1970): N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 320:21-a, 21-b (Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.§ 6-28-6
(1969); WASH. REV. CooE § 63.14.154 (Supp. 1970). See generally l CCH CoNSUMER
CREDIT GUIDE 11 4690 (1971).
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them and they took it upon themselves to adopt new theories to
provide consumer protection in the absence of legislative concern.
On the other hand, one need only cite to the various state retail
installment sales acts,77 the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act, 78 Fair
Credit Reporting Act,79 the proposed Fair Credit Billing Act,80 the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code,81 and the myriad of congressional
hearings and pending bills that deal with the subject of consumer
protection82 to demonstrate that consumers are extremely well represented today in the halls of Congress, in state legislatures, and before
governmental agencies.83 Senator Magnuson has stated, "The sixties
have rightly been called the Decade of the Consumer." 84 The seventies promise to see an acceleration of that decade's concern for the
well-being of the consumer. It_ is evident that the consumer can expect
continuing protection through the legislative process, which will
provide a thorough and careful analysis of all aspects of the particular
transaction at issue, to the benefit of consumers and commerce alike.
Thus, the necessity for a court to formulate a new rule based on
inadequate data no longer exists.85
It seems clear that a legislative solution is indicated. A legislature
would best proceed by making a careful analysis of the unique facts
involved in the operations of bank charge card systems and by devising a unique solution to take those facts into account. It should
not proceed by borrowing concepts designed to deal with dissimilar
transactions.
Furthermore, the rule that governs this issue should be uniform
in all jurisdictions, if possible. If the law varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, the task of accommodating the rights of the various
parties involved will be difficult as members of America's mobile
society engage in an increasingly large volume of interstate and inter77. See generally B. CURRAN, supra note 32.
78. U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
79. P.L. No. 91-508, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
80. S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
81. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (1969); UTAH CoDE .ANN,
§§ 70B-l-101 to 70B-9-103 (Supp. 1969).
82. See, e.g., 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, REP. No. 62, at 12, REP. No. 61, at 10,
REP. No. 60, at 5 (1971).
83. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE PROTECTlON 11-12, 86-87, 189
(1970).
84. Id. at 189.
85. While this Article was being prepared, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission introduced measures dealing directly with this problem. S. 652, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971): Proposed FTC Reg. § 433.1, 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971). Furthermore, it
is the understanding of the authors that several state legislatures in addition to New
York will be considering the issue this year. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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national charge card transactions. Hence, federal legislation that
should pre-empt local law would appear to be the best solution, so
that the parties would be subject to a uniform rule no matter in
what state a party was located or a portion of the transaction took
place. It could not solve the problems caused by use of charge cards
internationally, but it would be a far better alternative than a
myriad assortment of statutes passed by individual states.86
B. A Monetary Limit

Certain key features of bank charge card transactions must be
given due weight in any statute that attempts to deal with the problem of the assertability of consumer defenses in this setting. The
title of this Article, "New Cash or New Credit," highlights an issue
to which few persons have addressed themselves in the context of
arguing the viability of the insulation of creditors from consumer
defenses as that doctrine pertains to bank charge cards. The issue is
a vitally important one because the use of bank charge cards produces
a mixture of transactions in which some represent merely the implementation of a new payment mechanism, while others are a replacement for more traditional credit extensions.
Thus, the characterization of a typical charge card sale as a
credit transaction like those common in the past in the consumer
field may be misleading. This is not to say that bank charge cards
were not devised primarily as a method of extending a new form
of credit. Using the best indicators available, consultants predicted
to the banking industry certain market patterns that initially
prompted banks to enter the field. They predicted that the ratio
of persons purchasing goods and services and extending repayment
over a period of time would be high in relation to those using the
card as a new technique for immediate payment in lieu of checks or
cash. The public proved the banks and their consultants to be incorrect in their estimates. In 1967, Andrew Brimmer pointed out
that "[m]any holders of bank credit cards have used them primarily
as a convenience in facilitating payments rather than as a means of
increasing their debt balances."87 In other words, many cardholders
do not contemplate deferred payments when they use their cards;
they pay their entire balances as soon as billed.
86. See Felsenfeld, Competing State and Federal Roles in Consumer Credit Law,
45 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 487 (1970).
87. Hearings on H.R. 12616 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency,
!10th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967) (statement of Andrew F. Brimmer, member Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). See also text accompanying note 7 supra.
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The phenomenon noted by Mr. Brimmer now constitutes a fact
of life that banks have begun to-and legislators should-take into
careful consideration. At the time of the 1968 Federal Reserve Board
study, transactions that were solely convenience-card or payment
oriented in nature constituted between one-fifth and one-third of all
transactions.88 There is evidence that such percentage increased by
as much as forty per cent in the next l:lvo years.89 Figures assembled
by one of the regional interchange associations indicate, for instance,
that 538 million dollars in bank charge card sales and cash advances
in 1970 gave rise to only a 45 million dollar increase in outstanding
cardholder balances at the end of that year, as compared with 1969,
when 368 million dollars in sales and advances generated a 48 million dollar increase in outstanding balances. These statistics indicate
that the ratio of charge card usage in terms of dollars to corresponding credit balances generated increased from seven-to-one in 1969 to
twelve-to-one in 1970, a period of just two years.00 One simply cannot, therefore, proceed from the premise articulated by the consumer advocates that bank charge card transactions represent simply
another form of extending installment credit on a revolving basis.
In the light of these figures, characterizing a "typical" charge card
transaction today is a difficult task, but surely current statistics relating to the ratio between those transactions that result in immediate payment on billing and those that involve a repayment out
of future income should form an important basis upon which to
construct legislation.
Statistics directly bearing on this phenomenon can be gathered,
but the phenomenon can be deduced from other information as
well. For example, the average dollar amount for all sales slips in
1968 was approximately sixteen dollars; 91 the average now appears
to be approximately nineteen dollars. 92 From this fact it seems clear
that in the great majority of transactions conducted with bank charge
cards, the purchase is probably not of the type that is made because
88. Id.
89. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1970, at 66, col. 7.
90. Letter from E.H. Mackay, Executive Vice President, Western States Bankcard
Association, San Francisco, California, to the authors, dated May 24, 1971, on file in
the offices of the Michigan Law Review.
91. Wall St. J., March 15, 1968, at 24, col. 2 (western ed.). A survey made for Time
magazine indicates that the approximate charges on all bank charge cards used by a
family in an average month were between $20 and $50. Who Uses Bank Credit Cards,
AMERICAN DRUGGIST, February 9, 1970, at 79. See Bergsten, supra note 12, at 515-16.
92. See note 16 supra. The average was derived by dividing $1.09 billion in Inter•
bank member sales for the fourth quarter of 1970 by the 58 million sales slips processed
for that period.
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the purchaser does not have available funds and is anticipating
paying for the purchase in installments out of future earnings.
Rather, the purchaser simply finds it more convenient not to carry
cash and to pay for all of his minor purchases at one time during a
billing cycle.
The premise upon which to proceed by analogy for the convenience-card transaction is that of a cash sale. For these transactions,
the charge card system, insofar as the merchant-cardholder relationship is concerned, replaces cash. This premise has been stated succinctly:
The retailer who accepts a credit card in payment does not normally
think of the transaction as a a·edit transaction. Credit cards serve a
function similar to that of checks. A retailer who accepts a check in
payment for goods sold is thought of as engaging in a cash transaction even though his receipt of cash is delayed until payment of the
check.03

As to such transactions, the cardholder should be in no better,
nor worse, position than if he had paid for his purchase with cash.
His recourse, just as if he had paid in cash, should be against the
merchant.
The problem, of course, is that it is impossible to identify in
advance those transactions in which the consumer uses his charge
card in place of cash. It may well be, however, that practical economics should be determinative of the issue. A rule that would
allow consumers to dispute the payment of obligations resulting
from low-dollar-amount transactions would introduce severe diseconomies into a commercial transaction based on sophisticated processes.
Charge card systems are an economically sound convenience for the
public because of their capacity through a system that is highly dependent on electronic data processing to process a high volume of
consumer transactions at a low cost per item. 94 As a percentage of the
dollar value of the transaction, the processing cost obviously is
greater as the dollar value of the transaction is less. Low-dollar-value
transactions are, therefore, a burden on the system that is tolerated
primarily for the public convenience because they represent no
profit potential even when no disputed transactions are involved.
"'Whenever manual processing must be introduced into the system,
the cost of handling an item multiplies instead of increasing by some
93. R. JOHNSON, R. JORDAN &: ·w. WARREN,
30 (1969).
94. Bergsten, supra note 12, at 515-17.
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marginal amount.95 Every charge back resulting from an alleged
dissatisfaction would necessitate costly manual clerical processing.
Issuer bank personnel would have to contact the debtor and accumulate enough data to complete documentation and process a
charge back through the interchange system. Such a charge back,
even once it is in process in the system, would be an exceptional
item requiring special handling, thereby giving rise to extraordinary
costs as it flowed back to the merchant. Again, the burden on lowdollar-value items would be relatively greater.
Any right on the part of the consumer to assert defenses against
the issuer will place burdens on the system; but if the right is
granted in all transactions, no matter how small, those burdens will
be aggravated and may even be intolerable, both because of the high
cost in relation to the dollar value of the transaction and because
of the enormity of the volume of bank charge card transactions, which
number more than five million per week.96
The task of the legislature is to devise a technique that would differentiate between those transactions that are a replacement for cash
and those that replace other forms of credit and to treat those distinguishable transactions accordingly. There appears to be no method
available for easily distinguishing between a credit and a convenience
sale with precision, particularly since the decision to repay in installments may not be made by the consumer until after billing. Hence
any criterion used to treat transactions differently must be somewhat
arbitrary.
An arbitrary dollar figure should be selected. As to transactions
involving a sum greater than that figure, the cardholder should be
given the ability to assert against banks defenses he has against a
merchant. As to transactions involving a sum less than that figure,
it should be assumed that the charge card was used as a payment
mechanism to replace cash, and the cardholder should have recourse
only against the merchant. The figure chosen could be seventy-five
dollars; it could be fifty dollars. The selection of an appropriate
amount should be supported by an accumulation of data indicating
any relationship that may exist between the size of the purchase and
the likelihood of the transaction being one in which the consumer
is seeking to make extended payments.
Consumers do not seek credit through the creation of negotiable
or assignable paper involving third party financial institutions for
ten, fifteen, or twenty dollar purchases. Third party consumer credit
95. Id.
96. See note 18 supra.
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is typically extended for the purpose of purchasing major appliances
or other objects of comparatively high value. In those situations
in which credit may be extended for smaller purchases, such as when
a consumer may have a revolving charge account with a retailer,
the consumer's obligation rarely, if ever, involves a negotiable instrument (other than a check) or the assignment of paper by the
retailer to a financer. The party seeking to collect from the consumer
in small-dollar-amount transactions will be the merchant against
whom the consumer may assert defenses. Hence, it is not surprising
that the issue of subjecting remote creditors to defenses in low-dollaramount transactions has not been faced before and that little precedent exists in the consumer credit field for a technique of ascribing
different rights to different dollar value transactions.
Such an accommodation between economic practicality and enhancement of the rights of the individual consumer is not totally
without precedent, however. The National Consumer Center suggested a similar accommodation in its proposed National Consumer
Act, perhaps the most consumer-oriented draft legislation promulgated to date. That Act would give consumers the absolute right to
cancel a purchase of merchandise within three days of its purchase,
no matter what the form of payment.97 The NCA limits that right,
however, for economically sound reasons, to purchases of goods in
excess of fifty dollars. 98 Although the official comments give no indication of the rationale for the provision, it seems a safe assumption that the NCA's drafters determined that the societal costs
involved in creating a rescission right with regard to purchases of less
than fifty dollars were greater than the costs of making small-dollaramount purchases final. If that decision is correct for transactions
involving only two parties-a merchant and a consumer-it would
seem that the costs involved in "unwinding" a complex multiparty
transaction would a fortiori render it a socially unwise rule to allow
assertion of defenses against banks in transactions involving less
than fifty dollars. Thus, a similar differentiation of transactions by
dollar value should be useful in devising a workable rule for bank
charge card transactions. The differentiated treatment would solve
the intensely practical problem discussed above99 by eliminating
costly economic burdens in low-dollar-amount transactions in which
the potential for significant economic harm to the consumer is minimal. Furthermore, it would relieve merchants from the possibility
97. NCA § 2.505(2)(b) (First Final Draft).
98. NCA § 2.501(1) (First Final Draft).
99. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
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that collection costs would exceed the value of disputed merchandise
so that it would not be profitable for them to attempt to collect
from a consumer if the consumer chose to dispute payments. Thus,
new consumer rights would be created and would accomplish the
goal of consumer advocates without, however, economically stifling
a new and revolutionary payment system.

C. A Geographic Limit
Most consumer credit is local in nature. The consumer, the
merchant from whom he purchases, and the financing institution
that grants credit either through a direct loan or by purchasing accounts receivable or negotiable paper from a merchant, are typically
located in the same geographic area. Such is not the case, however,
in bank charge card transactions. Distance, differences in local laws,
and limitations on data processing capabilities all make disputes
that arise between any of the three or more parties to a bank charge
card transaction much less capable of economic resolution than the
typical local credit transaction. Moreover, as was indicated above,100
the issuer and depositary banks are typically different institutions
and may be separated by thousands of miles. Thus, the second major
distinction between other forms of consumer credit and the bank
charge card is the geographic and functional dispersion of the parties involved.
It has been suggested that it would be proper to subject the
issuer to defenses in those situations in which functional dispersion
does not exist-that is, when the issuer also performs the function
of a depositary bank-but not in those situations in which two
different banks are involved.101 When the bank involved has not
only issued the charge card to the consumer but also has a contractual arrangement with the merchant, it would at least theoretically
have an opportunity to investigate the merchant, whether or not
it would have the practical ability to conduct such an investigation.
Furthermore, if the issuer and depositary bank are the same institution, it is statistically more likely that the transaction will have been
100. See text accompanying notes 9 &: 10 supra.
101. Bergsten, supra note 12, at 516. The NCA may have reached just that result:
§ 2.407(9) would subject a credit card issuer to defenses in those situations in which
"the creditor is the issuer of a credit card which may be used by the consumer in the
consumer sale or lease as a result of a prior agreement between the issuer and the
seller or lessor." If this section is construed literally, it would allow consumers to
assert defenses in lender charge card cases only when the depositary and issuer banks
are the same institution or when organizations such as American Express or Diners
Club are involved. A similar analysis can be made of the current Massachusetts legislation on this issue. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1970),
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local. Bank charge cards are most typically issued by local offices of
banks to residents of the immediately surrounding community, and
the bank, in its depositary-bank role, will also have arrangements
with merchants in its immediate community.102 Such geographic
proximity facilitates contact by the bank with all parties to a potential dispute. The unfairness of depriving a merchant of his merchandise and requiring him to proceed against a cardholder located
at some distant point would be minimized. If the bank were performing both functions, it would be more apt to promote an accommodation or to take action if it felt that either the merchant or
the cardholder was being unfair. In effect it might act as an arbitrator to the dispute.
The major difficulty with treating transactions in which only one
bank is involved differently from those in which two or more are involved is that of making adequate disclosure to consumers so that
they might know at the time they engage in a transaction whether
they have the right to assert defenses only against the merchant or
whether they might also assert them against the issuer. If the right to
assert defenses against the issuer has any significance, the consumer
should know whether the right is available to him at the moment he
enters into the transaction.
Traditionally, banks and other lenders, including merchants,
seem to have granted consumer credit for major consumer purchases,
such as automobiles, home appliances, major sports equipment, and
major items of clothing. Such purchases are not usually made at
points significantly distant from the consumer's residence for such
reasons as high transportation costs and the consumer's lack of knowledge concerning terms of the sale being offered and the reputation of
the seller. Particularly for low-income consumers the potential shopping area is limited. 103 A feasible alternative, then, may be to grant
consumers the right to assert defenses against banks in all transactions in which the merchant and the cardholder reside in the same
geographic area, as they are most likely to do in traditional consumer
credit transactions. Because of the difficulties and costs that distance
adds to dispute settlement, however, that additional right ought to
be denied if the purchases are made from a merchant located at a
point geographically distant from the consumer's residence.
A geographic boundary could be established by the use of state

.

• 102. An exception to the geographic proximity of merchants to their depositary
bank arises when the merchant is a national concern such as a gasoline company,
airline, or chain clothing store, which may have outlets located at great distances
from the depositary bank.
103. D. CAPLovnz, THE POOR PAY MORE 49-57 (1963).
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boundaries,1°4 a circle surrounding the consumer's residence, or a
combination of both. The alternatives would, just as with the selection of a dollar amount, necessarily be somewhat arbitrary. Each of
the geographic limitations is based on the same practical premises,
however. One premise is that the cardholder-issuer and merchantdepositary bank relationships tend to be local. If a rule requires
that the cardholder-merchant relationship also be local before defenses can be asserted, the chances are good that all parties to a
transaction will be located in the same geographic area. In fact,
under such circumstances the statistical incidence of the issuer and
depositary banks being the same institution would be greatly increased.
The other premise is that in local transactions the problem of
merely establishing contact between the parties would be much easier
to solve.105 The issuer may have a greater chance of evaluating the
merchant. The merchant, if he has the sales slip charged back to him
and therefore has been deprived not only of his merchandise but
of his money as well, will at least be in a position easily to contact
the cardholder or, if necessary, to seek relief through the courts.
Under any of the suggested techniques for describing a boundary,
the merchant is apt to have some familiarity with collection procedures, attorneys, and creditors' remedies, so that his position will
not be as adverse as if the sale had involved a cardholder located
across the continent. And if a lawsuit is necessary, both the merchant and the consumer will be reasonably close to the forum in
which it will be conducted.
The differences between the alternative forms of defining the
appropriate geographic area are not great. The state boundary alternative has the disadvantage of being the more arbitrary of the
two, but has the advantage of being easier for a consumer to com104. Restricting a consumer's right to assert defenses to transactions that occur
within the boundaries of the state in which he lives is a technique that has received
the imprimatur of the National Consumer Center. In December 1970, the Consumer
Center promulgated a document containing changes it advocated for the UCCC in
states where it was being considered. Proposed § 3.410 extends, the concept contained in
the official version of the UCCC to situations that could result in the assertion of defenses against some direct lenders. In doing so, however, the suggested amendment to
the UCCC would draw a geographic boundary that would allow defenses to be asserted
only for intrastate transactions. National Consumer Law Center, Proposed Amendments
to the 1968 Official Text of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 3.410 (Publication
#Al92-50, Dec. 17, 1970).
105. The National Consumer Center predicated its suggested expansion of rights
against lenders, which include the limitation to intrastate transactions (see note 104
supra), upon the desire to impose subjection to defenses "in circumstances where the
extender of credit could reasonably be expected to know of the seller's manner of
doing business and responsibility ••••" Comment to Proposed New § 3.410, id.
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prehend in making his marketing decisions. It also has the disadvantage of treating states with large areas the same as states with
small areas. The distance between Redding and San Diego, California would span many states in other parts of the country. On
the other hand, insofar as legislation dealing with this issue may be
enacted by several states prior to the enactment of a federal statute,
the notion that a rule governing rights in a transaction will encompass the entire state seems to provide a certain desirable simplicity.
A circle surrounding the consumer's residence is a more rational
method for defining the area, however, since it takes into account
the major factor that creates difficulties-distance. It would also
protect consumers who shop in major market areas that cross state
lines. If a reasonable radius is selected, such as seventy-five miles,
one would find encompassed such multistate metropolitan markets
as New York City, which services areas in New Jersey and Connecticut; Washington, D.C., which services areas in Virginia and Maryland; Cincinnati, which services areas in Indiana and Kentucky; and
Chicago, which services areas in Wisconsin and Indiana, to name but
a few. The consumer would know in advance that he would be able
to assert defenses against his issuer provided that he made the purchase within seventy-five miles of his residence. Unfortunately, as he
approached the geographic limit of the circle surrounding his residence, the consumer might not be certain whether he would still be
in the zone affording him such additional protection. To the extent
that the existence of such doubt is undesirable, the state border
alternative becomes more attractive.
The alternative of allowing the consumer to assert defenses
against the issuer regardless of the distance between his residence
and the merchant's establishment seems unacceptable. It would be
apt to cause serious limitations on the consumers' present ability to
use bank charge cards nationally and internationally. As indicated
earlier,106 when a considerable geographic dispersion exists between
the cardholder and the merchant, and the cardholder disputes a
billing by a bank, the likely result is that the bank will not attempt
collection but will charge back the sales slip to the merchant, who
will be left with a difficult or impossible collection task. Being unable to evaluate consumers for good faith, merchants would thus
have an incentive to discontinue accepting offered charge cards from
consumers as payment for goods and services. On the other hand, a
rule limiting geographically the additional right to assert defenses
against banks is unlikely to be a burden on the consuming public
106. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
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because most major purchases are undoubtedly made near the consumer's residence. Unscrupulous merchants would be in no position
to use bank charge cards as a replacement for the creation of consumer paper in these local transactions in order to avoid the imposition of defenses. Since transactions in which consumer paper is
generated are normally local in nature, a geographic limitation
would not lessen the effect of foreclosing such a device to merchants seeking an unfair advantage.
VII. AN AccoMMODATION Is

NECESSARY

Legislatures must approach the issue under discussion with care
and with a willingness to achieve a true understanding of the nature
of a highly complex, sophisticated and, therefore, sensitive system.
An unwise law may prove onerous to all parties involved. Unfortunately, there are no indicators of what the effect of an unwise rule
would be. Extrapolating from those few jurisdictions that have extended to consumers the right to assert defenses against banks would
be an erroneous method of forecasting since it is unlikely that consumers are even aware that they have such a right in those jurisdictions. Absent that awareness, statistical data on the experience
to date under such a rule would be worse than useless-it would
be misleading.
Some prediction of the possible results of an unworkable rule
can be made. Banks will probably try to assure that they are indemnified for liability falling on them as a result of a merchant's
activities since they will probably not be able to police the merchant's activities in the first instance. They may do business with
only those businessmen with sufficient financial resources to insure
that, if defenses were ever successfully asserted against the bank,
the bank could always recover from the merchant. Second, they may
require merchants to maintain significant amounts on deposit as a
reserve against which they may charge off debts that consumers refuse to pay.
The effect of such measures, resulting from a rule exposing banks
to consumer defenses in all transactions, would constitute a severe
blow to this country's small businessmen since it would place them
at an even greater competitive disadvantage than they suffer from
today. Thus Congress, with its evident concern with the plight of
small businessmen,107 may have to fashion carefully a compromise
solution that considers the position of both consumers and small
107. See generally SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, THE IMPACT OF CREDIT CAlUlS

SMALL BUSINESS, H.R. REP. No. 91-1500, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings pursuant to H.R. Res. 66 Before the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems of the
Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
ON
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businessmen. Small businessmen typically begin their business lives
with a small amount of capital. However honorable they may be in
their business techniques, and no matter what the quality of goods
and services they offer, this fact alone tends to place them at a
competitive disadvantage. Multiparty charge card programs have allowed small merchants who cannot establish their mvn card programs
or revolving charge accounts to compete with larger businesses that
have their mvn systems. If banks are made subject to consumer defenses, a bank may impose financial requirements on those who will
be allowed to honor charge cards that small businesses may be unable to meet.108 A rule establishing across-the-board bank liability
to consumer defenses could have, then, as one of its pernicious
effects the exclusion of small businesses from bank charge card
systems and their attendant benefits.
It could well be argued that if charge cards are becoming a new
medium of exchange for the convenience of the public, if they are
replacing cash and checks, their universal acceptance by all merchants, large or small, carriage trade or discount house, chain store or
thinly capitalized "mom and pop" grocery store, is desirable. The
freedom of the consumer to shop where he chooses depends on such
universality of acceptance of the payment mechanism he chooses.
Consumer advocates propose a broad rule of law designed to exclude
certain merchants from bank charge card systems because of their
business practices; 100 but such a rule will likely exclude, for financial
reasons only, many small merchants as well. Competitive disadvantage because of an inability to accept the financial burdens associated
with a medium of exchange seems undesirable. Further, as charge
card transactions assume an even larger share of total retail sales, the
ability of a merchant to remain in business may one day depend on
whether he accepts charge cards. When that day arrives, a reappraisal
is likely to be made of a system that requires one private sector of
the economy, the banking industry, to decide, in effect, whether a
merchant must close his doors. The appropriateness of vesting that
responsibility in the banking industry deserves careful consideration
today, since such an effect is reasonably predictable.
In addition to having adverse effects on consumers and merchants,
a broad rule could also work significant hardships on the banking
industry. The highly regulated environment in which financing institutions operate renders them peculiarly vulnerable to any ill-con108. The New York Times, under the heading "Dealers Assail Legislation," described
the unhappy experience of boat dealers under a recent legislative amendment in New
York, which on its face affected only banks by permitting consumers to assert claims
against the financing bank in boat sales. N.Y. Times, Ja:i. 24, 1971, § 12, at I, col. 6.
109. See text accompan}ing note 29 supra.
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ceived restructuring of risk allocation. As a matter of simple economics, lenders may not be proper parties to subject to consumer defenses
in a broad range of cases since such an allocation would in tum force
them to restructure their business relationship with both merchants
and the consuming public.110 Moreover, the theory of risk shifting,
when advocated to support imposition of liability on suppliers,
assumes the ability of the supplier to raise prices and thereby redistribute a risk of loss from one consumer to many.111 Lenders, however, may not be able to distribute the risk through price increases.
In most jurisdictions, their charges are controlled by statute. 112 Thus,
one of the foundations of extended notions of liability is not present
when lenders are involved. For them, too onerous a rule can only
result in the restructuring or elimination of the services now provided.113
The complete elimination of charge card service by banks is not
so unlikely a result if too onerous a rule is imposed. Rather than
issuing charge cards, banks could rely more heavily on check overdraft and check guarantee plans, which would allow a consumer to
write checks in excess of amounts on deposit with the bank with the
excess charged against an open-end credit account. 114 Under no
theory yet advanced would a bank be subject to defenses assertable
against a merchant who accepted a check drawn on an account in
that bank. Ironically, consumers could obtain credit under such a
plan, but they would have no right to assert defenses against the
bank, even for major purchases. Moreover, the widespread use of
HO. Cf. Connor v. Great Western Sav. &: Loan Assn., 69 Cal. 2d 850, 872-73, 447
P.2d 609, 621-22, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 381-82 (1968) Gustice Mosk, dissenting).
lll. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 45ll, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) Gustice Traynor, concurring); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, ll20-22 (1960).
ll2. See generally l CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE ,i 510 (1971).
ll3. A recent study conducted by the Graduate School of Business Administration
of the University of Washington examined the effects of the lowering of the maximum
allowable interest rate in consumer credit transactions from l½ per cent to 1 per cent
per month in the State of Washington. Sixty-six per cent of the retailers interviewed
reported that they reject applicants for credit that they would have accepted prior
to the lowering of the rate. The summary of findings concludes: "The low-income
people who are marginal credit risks seem to have suffered the most so far from the
enactment of Initiative 245." GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, THE IMPAcr OF A CONSUMER CREDIT INTEREST LIMITATION
LAw 25 (1970). That finding illustrates a likely result of the imposition of increased
burdens on an industry that cannot raise its prices because they are legislatively
controlled. Increased burdens may mean reduced net income, not -loss shifting, to
creditors. No business will operate for long at a loss. At some point, therefore, since
income cannot be raised, reductions in the costs of operation of charge card services
will be sought, perhaps through a restriction on the class of consumers serviced, as in
Washington, or through a diminution in the value of the services offered.
114. See generally Comment, Bank Credit Plans, supra note 26.
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check overdraft plans in lieu of credit card systems would have
another untoward consequence for consumers. Merchants often will
not accept checks as a replacement for cash without personal knowledge of the drawer. Instead of having a new form of payment available worldwide, the increasingly mobile consumer would be forced
to less convenient mediums of exchange in most nonlocal transactions.
Thus a rule exposing banks to consumer defenses in all transactions could cause serious consequences to banks, merchants, and
consumers. On the other hand, a rule insulating banks from consumer defenses in all transactions may place too heavy a burden on
the consumer.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

If the current movement to subject financers to defenses in
transactions in which the seller initially extends credit to the consumer is soundly based, then some change in the current doctrine
that insulates banks from consumer defenses is called for in bank
charge card transactions. The judiciary should not undertake that
task, however. For purposes of uniformity, Congress would be the
best body to deal with the issue. It is clear, however, that Congress
must proceed with a full awareness of the special nature of the
transaction involved.
This Article has discussed the nature of bank charge card transactions, with emphasis on two factors deemed of particular importance in determining whether the consumer should be permitted to
assert against the issuing bank defenses that he has against the seller.
The first factor is the extent of geographic and functional dispersion
among the parties to the transaction; the second is the relation between the amount of a particular transaction and the economic
feasibility of providing an alternative party against whom the consumer can assert defenses arising out of the sale. A practical reason
that these factors are important to the resolution of the issue under
discussion is the burden that the indiscriminate assertion of consumer
defenses against issuing banks would place on the charge card system.
The consumer may, of course, assert claims against the merchant
from which he purchased goods or services. However, the societal
costs of providing the consumer with the option of asserting defenses against the bank attempting to collect an amount due,
thereby giving him the tactical advantage of not having to assume
the initiative in advancing his claim against the merchant, are
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simply prohibitive in small-dollar-amount transactions and in those
transactions geographically distant from the cardholder's residence.
A second reason for the importance of these factors is conceptual
in nature and rests on the notion that the charge card transaction
will be substituting for either a cash transaction or a traditional consumer credit transaction. It is clear that one cannot definitively
ascertain in any particular transaction which role the credit card
is playing. The best that can be done in any resolution of the question is to formulate presumptions based on observable facts associated with the particular sale and typically connected with one
type of transaction or the other. Although any lines would to some
extent be arbitrary, the need for consistency and predictability within
commerce makes them necessary. Such lines, embodied in the monetary and geographic tests set out above,11 5 rest on two assumptions.
First, sales over a certain monetary limit will, more often than not,
represent credit rather than cash transactions. Second, the kinds of
items that are generally bought by means of consumer credit are of
such a nature that typically they will not be purchased at a significant
distance from the consumer's residence. If it is determined from these
factors that the charge card transaction was equivalent to a credit
sale, the consumer's right to assert defenses should not be diluted
merely because the issuing bank, rather than the merchant, is in
the position of creditor vis-a-vis the consumer. Likewise, if it is determined that the transaction is equivalent to a cash sale, there seems
to be no reason to enlarge the consumer's options beyond what they
would be in an ordinary cash sale by permitting him to assert defenses to the issuing bank's attempted collection of amount due.
This is not to say that the inquiry should end with a disposition
of these issues. Many segments of the business, financial, and consuming communities will assuredly raise additional issues at legislative
hearings now in progress.116 This analysis, it is hoped, will help promote an understanding of bank charge card systems and provide a
first step toward the accommodation of conflicting interests that must
be served in any legislation dealing with this dramatic innovation in
payment mechanisms and credit-granting techniques.
115 See text accompanying notes 87-98 and 100-07 supra.
116. Such additional issues may include matters such as the maximum amount owed
to an issuer by an obliger on a series of transactions against which an obliger can
assert a defense arising out of a single transaction, whether a time limit should be im•
posed on the consumer's right to assert defenses, and whether the consumer should be
required to demand an adjustment from the merchant before asserting a defense
against the bank. As to the first issue, Idaho, in recently adopting the UCCC, included
a FIFO rule that would allow defenses to be asserted only against amounts outstanding
on the particular transaction involved. Ch. 299, § 2.404, [1971] Idaho Acts (I CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1J 4805, at 5!l!l6 (1971)).

